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BALOGH AND POWELL ON MYRDAL
by Harry G. Johnson*
It tells us something about both the presumptive political
and intellectual stature of Mr. Enoch Powell, and the lack of
self-confidence of academic development specialists in this
country, to be informed by the editor of this Bulletin in his
letter of invitation to contribute to the symposium that 'Mr.
PowelPs review has provoked alarm among the academic de-
velopmentalists". It tells us something, also, about prevail-
ing concepts of academic ethics that a supposedly independent
academic research institute, created by a new Ministry estab-
lished by the Labour Government, should choose a review by
a Conservative politician containing criticisms of the establish-
ment of that Ministry as a launching-pad for an exploration
and presumably at least partial validation of its own raison
d?etre. It tells us nothing we did not know before, though,
to search in vain through Lord Balogh's review (Ed. in the
first issue of this Bulletin pages 12-15) for any indication that
Myrdal is in large part criticizing his own earlier opinions, a
fact that Mr. Powell rightly stresses and one that drastically
alters the implications of the contrast drawn by Balogh between
'the arid, flat plain inhabited by the conventional modern eco-
nomists' and the towering '7peaks of interpretative political
economy' represented by the most. recent works of Gaibraith
and Myrdal.
Castles built on sand will necessarily look much nobler
than the local camel-drivers' tents, while they last; and it is
at least candid of a castle builder to admit that his building
has collapsed, and to explain wherein he miscalculated But
should we accept his assurance that no building can be built
until the nature of sand changes; and honour him doubly for his
capacity to learn and teach us from his own experience? Or
should we consult a less ambitious architect, experienced in
building humb!,ey but more durable constructions for desert habi-
tation?
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To drop the metaphor, there is a strong temptation for
a social idealist like Myrdal to conclude from close investi-
gation and deep understanding of the web of social circumstan--
ces that improvement is impossible without a sweeping revo-
lution in the way men think. In this respect Asian Drama
runs parallel to An American Dilemma. But the process of
sociological analysis itself tends to freeze what it touches into
a static equilibration of forces which apparently can only be
altered by violent and pervasive change. The problem is cre-
ated by the method, which abstracts from the inherently slow
processes of evolutionary change and learning by experience,
rather than the method revealing the problem. Moreover, the
results of the method can easily be inverted, as Mr. Powell's
review demonstrated, into a refutation of the idealism that
motivated its application: for if only revolution will do, and
revolution will suffice, it is only sensible to wait for the re-
volution, and save the resources that would otherwise be
wasted in attempting to gratify idealistic but irrelevant senti-
ments.
What seems to be missing from the implicit debate is a
sense of historical perspective on both sides. I cannot write
with any authority on Myrdal since I have not read Asian
Drama in full and neither of the two reviews under discussion
conveys a very clear idea of its philosophy and marshalling
evidence; but I strongly suspect that the situation depicted by
Myrdal represents an inflection point and not a plateau in
Asian development experience. One potent factor of change is
the recent revolution both in Asian agriculture and in Asian
agricultural policy. Another is a marked tendency towards
greater pragmatism in economic policy-making and a growing
questioning of the usefulness of pervasive state intervention in
the economic process. As regards Mr. Powell, I am inclined
to think that he was more right "years ago" than he is now,
that is, I agree that aid without a change of motivation on the
part of the recipient is likely to be wasted, but I believe on
the basis of what evidence is available to me that experience
of the problems and frustrations of promoting growth on tradi-
tional lines has been operating to change motivations and
methods. It is not really a question of arrogant insistence on
substituting western for indigenous value systems, but rather
one of patience in allowing time for the developing countries
to learn that certain kinds of values are not western, specif i-
cally, but essential to modern efficient production, while
other kinds of values are not specifically Asian, but archaic
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and counter-productive. Western observers are too inclined to
assume that non-Europeans are incapable of learning by experi-
ence - and also too inclined to ignore the evidence in their own
economies and economic policies of the obstinate pertinacity of
social resistance to change and improvement.
This brings me to the main issue for this symposium, the
question of the utility or otherwise of development aid. Let
me point out first that the question of development aid ought to
be, though it is usually not, distinguished sharply from the
question of whether academic specialization in the social scien-
ces of development is useful, To understand social processes
may be useful, even though it provides no direct, usable, and
transferable techniques for promoting development; one could
argue, in fact, that the assumption that research in this field
ought to produce directly transferable techniques with immedi-
ate big payoffs has had a powerful effect in diverting attention
from the production of scientific knowledge to the invention of
gimmickry. Academic research and theorizing about develop-
ment ought not to stand or fall by whether it can prove that
international aid transfers are a good thing, or whether those
specialized in this field make useful advisers to the govern-
ments of developing countries.
This point apart, the question of the usefulness or other-
wise of foreign aid can be subdivided into two questions: the
usefulness of foreign resources provided as aid transfers to
the development process, and the usefulness of foreign tech-
nical advisers in the promotion of development by public policy.
On the first question, the usefulness of foreign assistance
obviously depends on what is done with the money. This de-
pends on the policies of the donor and recipient governments.
In the past, with competition among aid donors to buy political
support and with recipient governments more concerned with
the demonstration of national identity and independence than
with effective economic development, aid money was frequently
wasted, at least according to the standards of the observing
economist. But now, with aid money scarce and recipients
obliged to compete for it, and with governments more than
before under an obligation to demonstrate results rather than
to demonstrate independence, it is increasingly likely that aid
money will be well used. Indeed, with the recent downward
trend in aid flows and associated need for rationing there is
emerging a strong probability that an excessive quantity of
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resources will be spent on evaluating development projects, as
compared with the residual resources available to finance them.
On the second question - the usefulness of foreign advi-
sers - the answer depends on what the advisers think their
role in the assistance process is, and on what knowledge they
have to bring to bear on it. In this respect, one has to con-
cede to Mr. Powell's point of view that much of past advice
has been based on the false assumptions that the role of the
advisers should be to recommend for less developed countries
"radical" policies unacceptable in the developed countries from
which the advisers have been drawn, and that the readiness to
recommend such policies is an adequate substitute for compe-
tence in the appropriate knowledge of social science techniques
and findings. Both the U. K. and the U. S. have done a grave
disservice to the developing countries, by casting them as
areas for experimentation by alleged social scientists who were
unable to demonstrate by accepted scientific procedures in
their own countries the superiority of their favoured policies
over what could be obtained by a trained social scientist from
observation and the application of common sense.
This is not to say that foreign advisers are useless, but
only to draw a distinctiOn between what the foreign adviser is
competent to contribute and what he is not, and to suggest
useful procedures in the selection of such advisers. What the
potential adviser has to contribute is a range of techniques for
the marshalling of data and the recognition of potential prob-
lem areas, derived on the one hand from training in statisti-
cal and other techniques and on the other hand from his know-
ledge of how social systems work. Where he is useless is
when he attempts to transplant preconceptions about what soci-
ety is about from his home to a foreign environment. Unfor-
tunately social scientists in this country are often taught to
believe that to be a "radical" according to the conventional
wisdom is both a substitute for social science understanding
and a special qualification for advising governments in less
developed countries. So long as that remains true, what the
adviser is transferring is not appropriate techniques but inap-
propriate attitudes, and the question whether there are trans-
ferable techniques of development is quite beside the point,
because if they existed the advisers would have no incentive to
learn what they were. (In fairness, one should add that Ame-
rican advisers have frequently been ineffective for quite differ-
ent reasons: either because they tend to assume that United
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States practice is the ultimate standard of modernity, or be-
cause they treat work in developing countries simply as an
opportunity to apply computer technologies of data- processing
developed for the United States.)
In answer to the general question of the usefulness of
development aid, in the twin senses of resources and expert
advice, therefore, I would maintain that the usefulness of aid
depends on the circumstances on both the donor and recipient
sides, and that these have been evolving with experience and
the accumulation of knowledge. Political conditions in the re-
cipient countries may ensure that aid is both wasted and re-
sented: one has to be aware of the political dynamics of de1
colonization and the establishment of national independence.
Political motivations for giving aid in the donor countries - a
mixture of charity, commercial interest in holding markets,
and political interest in holding allies - may ensure the same
result, in some cases deliberately.
This does not imply that prevailing concepts of develop-
ment and development assistance must be abandoned; but it
does imply that academic specialists on development problems
need to be both more sophisticated in their appreciation of the
political aspects, and particularly the political dynamics, of
the aid process, and more philosophical in their approach to
what development assistance can do. In particular, develop-
ment specialists need to cultivate a long view of the develop-
ment process, as a difficult exercise in social and economic
transformation to which outside assistance can at best contri-
bute marginal acceleration, and may at worst help to keep in-
competent drivers in the driver's seat of a stalled engine.
1See Harry G. Johnson (ed.). Economic Nationalism in Old
and New States (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1968).
